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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Admiralty-Last Clear Chance in Collision
The famous case of Davies v. Mann1 gave birth to the doctrine of
last clear chance by holding that if one party in the exercise of reasonable care has the last opportunity to avoid the harm, the other party's
prior negligence is not a proximate cause of the result. This doctrine
has in most common-law jurisdictions allowed plaintiffs to avoid the
harshness of the bar of contributory negligence, and has shifted the2
burden of the loss to the defendant although both parties were at fault.
Whether this common-law doctrine is applicable in admiralty collision cases has never been decided by the United States Supreme Court.
However, two recent district court decisions serve to point out the
conflict existing among the lower federal courts. In Williamson v. The
Carolina8 the libelant moored his vessel in an unseaworthy manner so
that the displacement waves of the respondent's tug and barge caused
her to be tossed about with resultant damage. Respondent was at fault
in failing to maintain a proper lookout. The court rejected libelant's
contention that respondent, since its"negligence was subsequent in time
to that of libelant's, should bear the total loss. The admiralty rule of
divided damages, the court reasoned, was more equitable where there
was equal fault of both parties.
In Arundel Corp. v. The City of Calcutta4 the libelant's scow collided with respondent's anchored vessel and sank. The court, assuming
that respondent's vessel was improperly anchored and therefore at fault,
held the libelant solely responsible for the- loss, on the theory that it,
being cognizant of the anchored vessel's position, had the last clear
chance to avoid the collision. 5
The divergence of opinion illusirated by the two principal cases is
not resolved by an examination of the history of last clear chance in
admiralty. Steam Dredge No. 16 is apparently the first admiralty-case
in the United States dealing with last clear chance. There the First
Circuit reviewed several Supreme Court decisions 7 in which the facts
110 M.&W. 546 (1842).
2 See PROSsER, TORTS § 52 (2d ed. 1955); Annots., 92 A.L.R. 47 (1934), 119
A.L.R. 1041 (1939), and 171 A.L.R. 365 (1947). See also Note, 36 N.C.L. Rav. 545
'172 F. Supp. 593 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
('I"" F. Supp. 417 (E.D.N.C. 1958).
' Note that here the respondent or defendant successfully utilized last clear
chance, traditionally a plaintiff's defense to contributory negligence, to avoid
liability.
0134 Fed. 161 (1st Cir. 1904) (not a collision case).
"The New York, 175 U.S. 187 (1899) ; The America, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 432
(1875); Atlee v.Packet Co., 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 389 (1874) ; The John Fraser,
62 U.S. (21 How.) 184 (1858). Other early Supreme Cour.t cases involving
successive faults where both vessels were held liable are: The North Star, 106
U.S. (16 Otto) 17 (1882) ; The Continental, 81 U.S. '(14 Wall.) 345 (1871).
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would have warranted an application of the doctrine, but in which it
was not mentioned, and concluded that the doctrine of Davies v. Mann
should not be applied in maritime law. Later the Seventh Circuit in
The Norman B. Reams stated that the doctrine of last clear chance was
created to mitigate the common-law principle that contributory negligence is a bar to recovery, and did not apply in this country in admiralty,
since under martime law contributory negligence effects only a division
of damages.
The position taken by Steam Dredge No. 1 and The Norman B.
Ream was weakened by The Perseverance.0 There a vessel was at
fault for being improperly anchored; a tug was at fault in not steering
clear of the anchored vessel. The tug was held solely liable, the anchored
vessel's fault being considered as a mere condition rather than a contributing cause of the collision.' 0 The court stated: "The situation is
similar to that often comprised within the formula that a wrongdoer is
solely liable if he has a 'last clear chance' of avoiding the damage.""
Eight years later the Second Circuit applied last clear chance by name
in The Cornelius Vanderbilt12 and The Sanday.13 Neither case cited
Steam Dredge No. 1 or The Norman B. Ream, nor did either case discuss the doctrine's applicability to admiralty libels-the court apparently assuming that it was applicable. From an overall survey it appears
that, the Second,'1 4 Third, 5 and Fifth'8 Circuits and a district court 17
of the Ninth Circuit have adopted last clear chance, while the First 8
and Seventh Circuits' 9 and a district court 20 of the Fourth Circuit have
rejected it.
8252 Fed. 409 (7th Cir. 1918) (dictum).
63 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1933).
It is often held that the antecedent fault of one vessel is not a contributing
cause if it merely creates a condition or situation which makes it possible for the
subsequent fault of the other vessel to bring about collision. See, e.g., Cornell
Co. v. Phoenix Co., 233 U.S. 593 (1914) ; The Syosset, 71 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1934);
The Socony No. 19, 29 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1928).
11 63 F.2d at 790 (emphasis is added to point out that the court did not consider
itself as applying last clear chance except by analogy).
12120 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1941).
18 122 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1941).
14 Kosnac v. The Norcuba, 243 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1957) ; The Cedar Cliff, 149
F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1945); Southern Transp. Co. v. Dauntless Towing Line, 140
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1944); The Sanday, 122 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1941); The Cornelius Vanderbilt, 120 F2d 766 (2d Cir. 1941); Arundel Corp. v. The City of
Calcutta, 172 F. Supp. 593 (E.D.N.Y. 1958) ; In re Adams' Petition, 125 F. Supp.
110 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ; Manhattan Lighterage Corp. v. United States, 103 F. Supp.
10

274 op.
(S.D.N.Y.
1951).Co. v. United States,
Dougherty
207 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1952).

18 Crawford v. Indian Towing Co., 240 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Richmond v.
The Connie C. Cenac, 157 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. La. 1957), aff'd sub twm. Cenac
Towing Co. v. Richmond, 265 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1959).
17 Hertz v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
SSteam Dredge No. 1, 134 Fed. 161 (1st Cir. 1904) (not a collision case
Th Norman B. Ream, 252 Fed. 409 (7th Cir. 1918) (dictum).
"Wllamo
v. The Carolina, 158 F. Supp. 417 (E.D.N.C. 1958). Buet cf.
Curtis Bay Towing Co. v. Mansfield, 207 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1953), where, in an
action under the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1953), the
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In attempting to determine what should be the position of the admiralty courts in relation to the doctrine of last clear chance, certain
basic maritime principles of liability and recoverable damages must be
examined. Liability in admiralty collision law is, as at common law,
based on fault. 2 ' The effect of dual fault in admiralty, however, is entirely different from its effect at common law. If only one vessel is at
fault that vessel must bear the entire loss,22 but if both vessels are deemed
at fault the divided damages rule of American admiralty law comes into
play, i.e., each vessel bears half the total loss.23 This rule is qualified
by the "major-minor fault" principle: if one vessel is grossly negligent
and the other at fault only to a minor degree, the minor fault is held not
to be a contributing cause of the accident and the entire loss is borne
by the vessel grossly at fault 24 The result is in many cases the same
as would be reached under last clear chance, but the rule differs from
last clear chance in that it is limited to instances where it would be
unjust to divide the damages because of the gross fault of one vessel and
in that it is not dependent upon one fault preceding the other.
Many of the standards imposed upon the mariner are statutory,2 5
and one who violates a statutory duty before a collision is faced with the
rule of The Pennsylvania.2 6 That rule creates a legal presumption of
fault that may be overcome only by showing not only that the violation
did not but that it could not have been a cause of the collision. Modifying this rule slightly is the doctrine as to errors in extremis. This
doctrine provides that when a vessel, through no fault of her own, is
placed in a position where collision is seemingly imminent, she will not
be held at fault for action taken in violation of the statutory rules or the
be explained as
standards of due care in navigation, when the fault can
27
resulting from the extremity in which she was placed.
court allowed the issue of last clear chance to go to the jury. The court cited no
authority, nor did it discuss the doctrine's applicability to a maritime cause of
action.
21
' The Java, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 189 (1872).
"The Clara, 102 U.S. (12 Otto)" 200 (1880); Oaksmith v. Garner, 205 F.2d
262 (9th Cir. 1953).
.'The North Star, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 17 (1882); The Catherine, 58 U.S.
(17 How.) 170 (1855).
",
The Victory, 168 U.S. 410 (1897) ;'The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186 (1895) ; The
City of New York, 147 U.S. 72 (1893) ; The Great Republic, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.)

20 (1874).

' International Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 144-47d (1953); Inland Rules, 33 U.S.C.
H8 151-232 (1953) ; Great Lakes Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 241-95 (1953); Western
Rivers Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 301-56 (1953). See GlmxoRE & BLACK, ADmmALTY
§7-3 (1957).
2 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1874); Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Cornell
S.S. Co., 265 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1959). See also GiLmoRE & BLACK, ArDmIALTY § 7-5
(1957); GRinrnr, CoLnISloN § 201 (1949).
" The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1852); Pacific-Atlantic S.S.
Co. v. United States, 175 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1949); The Stifinder, 275 Fed. 271
(2d Cir. 1921). See also Gi.moRE & BLAcK, ADMIRALTY § 7-3 (1957).
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If the admiralty courts were to accept completely the principles of
last clear chance in collision cases, the effect would be in many instances
a nullification of these basic maritime principles. In cases where there
is substantial fault on the part of both vessels, but one is subsequent in
time to the other, the loss, rather than being divided, would be borne
by the last wrongdoer. In this connection it is submitted that the need
for last clear chance in the common law is not present in the maritime
law. The doctrine of last clear chance was designed to mitigate the
harshness of the bar of contributory negligence. In admiralty contributory negligence has never, as a rule, 28 barred recovery, 20 By division of
damages the maritime law has evolved its own equitable adjustment
betveen the parties.
The rule of The Pennsylvania, which in many instances requires at
least a division of damages,30 apparently would be made ineffective, with
the result that the subsequent wrongdoer would bear the total loss regardless of any breach of a statutory 'duty by the other vessel. Since
the doctrine of last clear chance tends to place liability on the last
wrongdoer, it is possible as a practical matter that a vessel making tho
last error could be 'held liable even though her action properly should
be classified under existing admiralty law as a reasonable error in judgment while in extremis and thus excusable.
A view of the overall picture seems to indicate that the doctrine of
last clear chance has no real foundation or place in admiralty law. It
would seem to conflict with some basic maritime principles, while other
admiralty rules, when justice dictates, can be applied to reach the same
result.31 It is submitted that an adoption of this common-law doctrine
by the American maritime courts would result in no real advance, but
rather a regression from the more desirable measures of liability cur32
rently employed.
RICHARD VON BIBERSTEIN, JR.

See discussion of "major-minor fault" rule at text, footnote 24 supra, and
discussion in note 10 supra. As,was stated in Cenac Towing Co. v. Richmond,
265 F.2d 466, 471 -(5th Cir. 1959): "Each case stands on its own. Call it anything: a condition, a remote cause, a non-contributing fault, the last clear chance;
if, in the circumstances of the particular case, the respondent's fault is slight in
comparison with the libellant's or if there was a clear cleavage between respondent's fault and.the collision, an admiralty court will evaluate the respective
degrees of fault and exonterate the respondent."
2" The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890).
"0See Lie v. San Francisco & Portland S.S. Co., 243 U.S. 291 (1917) ; Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Cornell S.S. Co., 265 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1959).
"' See discussion of "major-minor fault" rule in text at note 24 supra, and
discussion in note 10 supra.
"-Presumably if a collision libel is brought in a state court, that court will be
bound to apply maritime law. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406
(1953); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) ; Southport Transit Co. v. Avondale Marine
Ways, Inc., 234 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Intagliata v. Shipowners & Merchants
Towboat Co., 26 Cal. 2d 365, 159 P.2d 1 (1945).
26
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Compromise and Settlement-Insurance-Liability Carrier's
Settlement as a Bar to Insured's Suit
The standard automobile liability insurance policy provides that the
insurer shall defend any suit against the insured for personal injury or
property damage caused by accident and arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of the automobile. In addition the policy stipulates
that the insurer may make such investigation and settlement of any
claim or suit as it deems expedient. Two recent North Carolina decisions have limited the effect of such settlements1 made by the insurance
company.
In Beauchamp v. Clark,2 an action for personal injuries, plaintiff,
while driving his father's truck, collided with defendant's vehicle. Plaintiff protested and denied fault when his father's insurance company informed him that it intended to settle with defendant because its investigation had indicated that plaintiff was at fault. Insurer, nowithstanding,
settled with defendant. Subsequently, in this action defendant pleaded
the settlement in bar. The court held that in the absence of evidence
that plaintiff ratified or assented to the settlement it could not bar his
action because the insurer had no authority under the settlement provisions of the policy to compromise his cause of action. The court noted
that plaintiff was not the policy-holder, that he was not aware of the
policy or its provisions when he drove the truck, and that he had in no
way assented to the settlement.
This decision left some doubt as to the effect of the settlement where
the insured vehicle owner objected to, or was unaware of, the settlement.
In Lampley v.Bell3 plaintiff policy-holder first learned of his liability
carrier's settlement with defendant from the allegations of defendant's
answer. Plaintiff had told his adjuster, prior to the settlement, that he
intended to pursue his claim against the other driver. The trial court
held that the insurance policy constituted a binding contract between
plaintiff and his insurer which gave the insurer the right and power to
settle with defendant on behalf of the plaintiff and that plaintiff was
bound thereby. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding
that although plaintiff was a party to the insurance contract, the insurer
had no more authority to compromise his claims against the defendant
than the insurance carrier had to settle on behalf of the plaintiff in the
Beauchamp case.
1 "Settlement" as used in the text refers to a settlement made by an insurance
company under an automobile liability policy. "A completed compromise and
settlement fairly made between persons legally competent to contract and having
the authority to do so with respect to the subject matter of the compromise, and
supported by sufficient consideration, operates as a merger of, and bars all right
to recover on, the claim or right of action included therein; as would a judgment
duly entered between said persons." Beauchamp v. Clark, 250 N.C. 132, 139, 108
S.E2d 535, 539 (1959).
2250 N.C. 132, 108 S.E.2d 535 (1959). -250 N.C. 713, 110 S.E.2d 316 (1959).
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Beauchamp and Lampley presented two distinctly different problems arising under the settlement provisions of an automobile liability
insurance policy. In Beauchamp plaintiff was insured under the terms
of the policy, but he was not a party to the contract of insurance. In
Lampley plaintiff was the insured policy-holder, a party to the contract.
Lampley points out that the holding in Beauchamp was not based upon
the absence of privity of contract between plaintiff and the insurer. The
reasoning behind both cases is that the settlement provisions in the
insurance policy do not grant the insurer the authority to execute a
settlement on behalf of the insured and bind him thereby, where the
insurer makes the settlement and procures releases either without the
knowledge or consent of the insured or over the protest of the insured,
unless he has ratified the settlement. It is not apparent which party has
the burden of proof. It could be argued that the cases indicate that the
defendant would have the burden of showing consent, knowledge, or
ratification ;4 but the plaintiff in Beauchamp undertook to prove that he
objected to the settlement and in Lampley that the settlement was made
without his knowledge.
An earlier decision shows what happens when plaintiff, having undertaken to prove absence of knowledge or consent, fails to establish it.
In Cannon v. Parker5 plaintiff, the trustee in bankruptcy for the policyholder, was seeking property damages arising out of a collision between
the policy-holder's truck and defendant's automobile. Plaintiff alleged
in his reply that he first learned of his liability carrier's settlement from
the allegations of defendant's answer. On trial plaintiff, for reasons not
apparent, introduced his insurance policy and the release obtained thereunder, but failed to introduce evidence that he was unaware of the settlement, whereupon defendant demurred ore tenus to the evidence. Held,
the settlement bound the plaintiff under the evidence before the court.
The court explicitly did not reach the question of the validity of the reply
because the plaintiff had failed to offer proof on the issue. The court
gave no indication that it considered the release as having been executed
under the terms of the policy. There was nothing in the record to show
that it was. Thus, the court, apparently relying on the fact that the
release showed on its face that the policyholder, and not the insurer,
had paid a certain sum of money to the defendant and had obtained his
release, held that the plaintiff's action was barred.
"The language of these cases and the cases which they cite'is subject to two
interpretations: (i) that the settlement provisions in the policy create a presumption that the release is binding on the policy-holder and the burden is on the policyholder to show lack of consent or knowledge, or that he objected to it; or (ii) that
the policy provisions do not in themselves give the insurer the authority to settle
the policy-holder's claims and the defendait must show knowledge, consent or
ratification on the part of the insured.
5249 N.C. 279, 106 S.E.2d 229 (1958).
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In Beauchamp and Lampley the defendants were precluded from
using the settlements as a defense. Suppose that the defendants had
counterclaimed after the settlements were found not to bar the plaintiffs.
Could the plaintiffs use the settlements as a defense to the counterclaims?
The appellee's brief in Lampley presented this question,0 but since the
matter was not in issue it was not answered.7 An analysis of the consideration involved in the settlement between the defendant and the
insurance company would tend to indicate that the plaintiff could use
the settlement as a defense. A release executed for a money payment
may take either of two forms. The only express release may be from
the payee to the payor; or there may be an express agreement that each
releases the other. The legal effect of either form is the same as between
parties to the release. The court will regard the release as it would a
judgment and prevent the releasee from later asserting his claim against
the releasor.8 In Beauchamp and Lampley the bargain took the first
form, that of a unilateral release. It is to be remembered that in those
cases the parties were not dealing with each other. One of them, the
plaintiff, was represented by his insurance company, which under the
circumstances had no authority to defeat any claim the plaintiff might
have had against the defendant. The defendant, on the other hand,
represented himself. Undoubtedly, he had the authority to give up any
claim he might have had against the plaintiff-indeed this was the very
thing for which the insurer was bargaining. Thus the defendant gave
up his claim against the plaintiff in consideration not for plaintiff's releasing him plus a cash settlement in lieu of damages, but for the cash
settlement alone. Therefore, since the defendant had received all to
which he was legally entitled under the circumstances, it would seem that
he would be bound by his promise-namely, to forego suing the plaintiff.
Consequently, the plaintiff should be able to defeat the defendant's
counterclaim. The defendant could have avoided this result if he had
made sure that the plaintiff joined in the settlement agreement.
It is submitted that the court reached the correct result in the principal cases. North Carolina is in line with the weight of authority,9
and, as pointed out in Lampley,' 0 there now seems to be no contrary
authority. The opposite result in effect would have established the
insurer as an arbitration board with sweeping jurisdiction and authority.
' Brief for Appellee, pp. 7-9.

G. DuDLEY HUIPHREY,

JR.

7The author has been unable to find any case in which this problem was considered.
8
Snyder v. Kenan Oil Co., 235 N.C. 119, 68 S.E.2d 805 (1952).
See, e.g., Fikes v. Johnson, 220 Ark. 448, 248 S.W2d 362 (1952) ; Hurley v.
McMillan, 268 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Birkholz v. Cheese Makers
Mut. Cas. Co., 274 Wis. 190, 79 N.W.2d 665 (1956); Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 937
(1953).
0 250 N.C. 713, 715, 110 S.-E.2d 316, 318 (1959).
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Criminal Procedure-Waiver of Indictment Precluded When
Offense Charged Under Lindberg Act

In Smith v. United States' the petitioner and his companions had
escaped from a Florida jail and had seized an automobile, forcing its
owner to accompany them to Alabama where he was released unharmed.
Petitioner waived indictment and was charged by information that he
did "knowingly transport in interstate commerce ...

a person .

on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury ....

."

.

. who

2
had been unlawfully seized, kidnapped, abucted and carried away .... ,The information did not allege whether the victim had been released
harmed or unharmed. The accused was convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment pursuant to the Lindberg Act. 3 This act provides that
punishment shall be: (1) by death if the kidnapped person has not been
liberatedunharmed and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or
(2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if the death
penalty is not imposed. On appeal the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. 4 After granting certiorari the United States Supreme Court
ruled that indictment could not be waived, and the case was reversed
and remanded with instructions to dismiss the information., In a sixto-three decision the Court held that indictment was required because
the statutory offense is sufficiently broad to justify a capital verdict
and hence the trial must proceed on this basis, even though the evidence later establishes that such a verdict cannot be sustained because
the victim was liberated unharmed. The majority stated that although
the imposition of the death penalty will depend upon the proof introduced at trial, that circumstance does not alter the fact that the offense
is one which may be punished by death.
In all capital offenses indictment is mandatory under the fifth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States which provides
that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital . .. crime, unless

This policy has

been incorporated into Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(a) which
states: "An offense which may be punished by death shall be prosecuted
by indictment." (Emphasis added.) In the principal case the majority
based their decision on the premise that kidnapping under the statute
is a capital offense whether or not there is an allegation that "the kidnapped person has not been liberated unharmed."(;
Prior to the principal case the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had
held that kidnapping was not a capital offense when the indictment
failed to allege that the victim was not liberated unharmed. 7 However,
2
' 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1950).
Id. at 7.
1-360 U.S. 1 (1959).
1 Smith v. United States, 250 F2d 842 (5th Cir. 1957). On an earlier appeal

conviction had been set aside on the ground that the trial court had denied defendant due process. Smith v. United States, 238 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1956).
0360 U.S. at 8.
6360 U.S. 1 (1959).
"United States v. Parker, 103 F.2d 857, 861 (3d Cir. 1939).
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the decisions of the Second Circuit were in conflict with this view, and
the Supreme Court in the principal case cited with apparent approval
the dictum in United States v. Parrino,s to the effect that the allegation
that the victim was not released unharmed goes only to the punishment
and is not part of the offense and that a defendant has no right to be
informed beforehand of the punishment the Government seeks. When
viewed in the light of this dictum the present position of the court
appears to be that an allegation in the indictment that the victim was
"not released unharmed" is not necessary to allow either the introduction of evidence of harm or the jury's recommendation of the death
penalty. Such a rule would seem to place the defendant in danger of
being prejudicially surprised at the trial.9 The Court in the principal
case states that the defendant's procedural safeguards against such surprise are discovery and a bill of particulars. 10
This ruling may present serious problems to the defendant in the
conduct of his defense. If evidence of harm were admitted under an
indictment which did not allege harm, then it would appear that the
heretofore well-defined requirements of definiteness, exactitude and
certainty in an indictment 1 ' are not satisfied. In a similar situation,
for example, it has been held that where the degree of larceny, and
consequently the severity of punishment, depends upon the value of the
property stolen, then the value of such property must be alleged and
proved. 12 Certainly there is doubt that such an indictment as would
be permitted by the principal decision provides the defendant with sufficient information to enable him to prepare his defense.' 3 He will not
be able to ascertain from it whether the prosecution will seek to establish the fact that he did not liberate the victim unharmed, and thus he
will not know the full extent of his jeopardy until the trial. Certainly
the attorney who must conduct the defense is in danger of being surprised. Even if defendant is aware that he has harmed the victim it
is often difficult to persuade a criminal defendant to be frank with his
counsel.
Where can a defendant finding himself in such a position look for
protection from surprise? The court has said that this protection will
be discovery, 14 but it is doubtful that discovery will provide the defendant with the information he seeks. It is clear from the legislative
8180 F.2d 613, 615 (?d Cir. 1950).
0360

2

U.S. at 12 (separate opinion).

Id. at 10.

" "If the indictment leaves the defendant in fair doubt as to the offense charged,
it fails to meet the test that an indictment. should 'leave no doubt in the minds of
the accused and the court of the exact offense intended to be charged'." Bratton
v. United States, 73 F.2d 795, 797 (10th Cir. 1934).
"2Cartwright v. United States, 146 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1944).
" 360 U.S. at 16-17 (separate opinion).
"IId. at 10.
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8

history' of the Federal Rules that the grand jury minutes cannot be
reached by a defendant under Rule 16.16 Rule 16 is of no help in reaching the statements of government witnesses, except in the comparatively
rare case where such statements have been seized or obtained by process.
The rule itself provides that the motion for discovery may be made "at
any time after the filing of the indictment or information"; thus the
defendant has no right to discovery prior to indictment. The use of
this rule is made even less effective if discovery is denied by the trial
court because there can be no interlocutory appeal from such denial.",
The other provision for discovery is Federal Rule 17(c) which provides for discovery before trial through subpoena. The written statements of witnesses are considered as "papers and documents"' 8 within
the language of this rule and thus are seemingly available to the defendant. However, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia is the
only court which has permitted defendants to reach the statements of
witnesses under this rule. 19 The majority of courts 20 have denied
defendants this opportunity because such statements are not evidentiary
until the witness has testified in court, and there is always the possibility
that the witness will not be called at the trial.
A more liberal construction of Federal Rules 16 and 17(c) would
be prevented by a recent statute, 21 the language of which specifies:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no
statement or report in the possession of the United States which
was made by a Government witness or prospective Government
witness (other than the defendant) to an agent of the Government shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection
until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial
of the case. (Emphasis added.)
This statute make no distinction between capital and noncapital
offenses. Therefore, if defendant must rely on discovery or inspection
for his protection he will not know that he may be on trial for his life
15 Oriield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure, 59 W. VA.
L. REv. 221 (1957).
" Fn. R. Cvan. P. 16: "Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the
filing of the indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for the
Government to permit defendant to inspect . . . books, papers . . . obtained from
or belonging to defendant or obtained from others by seizure or by process ...
17 Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221 (1929).
18 Fryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 134, 136-37 (D.C. Cir. 1953).

"'Ibid. Contra, United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367 (D.D.C. 1954) (a

non-capital case).
2 United States v. Echeles, 222 F.2d 144, 152 (7th Cir. 1955); United States
v. Kiamie, 18 F.R.D. 421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Brown, 17
F.R.D. 286, 287-88 (N.D. Ill. 1955); United States v. Bryson, 16 F.R.D. 431,
437 (N.D. Cal. 1954). The foregoing cases were all concerned with non-capital
offenses. However, the same rationale would apply in either case; there is no
more advance certainty that a given witness will be called in a capital case than
in a218
non-capital
U.S.C. §case.
3500 (1958).
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until the Government witness has testified that the victim was "not
liberated unharmed." In a case 22 decided recently by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals the statute was construed to prohibit a defendant
from reaching the statements of witnesses until those witnesses had
testified. Fourteen days after the principal case was decided this 23construction was affirmed by a divided United States Supreme Court.
The opportunity of inspection during the trial would be of little value
to the defendant. Cross-examination, impeachment and rebuttal depend
on careful investigation and preparation, and continuances during the
trial are usually too short to allow this. 2 4 Kidnapping cases may present complex issues that require extensive investigation and research
before trial, and the defendant who is not aware of all the problems he
will face until after the testimony of prosecution witnesses will be
seriously prejudiced.
The last safeguard recommended by the court in the principal case
was the use of a bill of particulars. 25 There is no doubt that a bill may
be obtained in this situation. 26 However, since a bill of particulars is
required only to set out with certainty the offense charged, 2 7 it will not
aid the defendant here, because under the Court's view of the nature and
elements of kidnapping the specific information the defendant seeks is
28
cited in the
not an element of the offense. United States v. Parrino,
to
the punishprincipal case, stated that the matter of harm goes only
ment and does not affect the nature of the crime. Therefore, it does
not appear that the Government would be required, in a bill of particulars or otherwise, to make known the punishment it intends to seek or
the requirements for such punishment that it intends to prove. Although
it is true that the evidence must conform to the bill,2 9 it would be inconsistent to say that evidence of harm not alleged in the bill is inadmissible for this reason, since the courts have held that such evidence may
be introduced when harm is not alleged in the indictment.
The holding in the principal case presents a problem to the defendant
when the prosecution has no intention of alleging or proving that the
victim was harmed, as would appear to be the situation in the principal
case. By the majority opinion, this defendant would be subject to the
" United States v. Lev, 258 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1958).

" Lev v. United States, 360 U.S. 470 (1959).

CRimiNAL PRocEDuE FRo AJPMT TO APPEAL 330 (1947).
25360 U.S. at 10.
2" "A bill should only be required where the charges of an indictment are so
general that they do not advise defendant of the specific acts of which he is
accused." United States v. Rosenwasser Bros., 255 Fed. 233, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 1919).
2, ORFrELD,

" The fundamental purpose of a bill of particulars is to apprise the defendant
or the crinze charged with sufficient particularity to enable him to properly prepare a defense to such charge . . . ." United States v. Macleod Bureau, 6 F.1.D.
590, 592 (D. Mass. 1947). (Emphasis added.)
28 180 F.2d 613, 615 (2d Cir. 1950).
9 Braatelien v. United States, 147 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1945).
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same confinement and delay that would be entailed had the prosecution
sought the death penalty. The purpose of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 7(a), which provides for waiver of indictment in non-capital
cases, was to avoid keeping just such a defendant languishing in jail
getting no credit toward his sentence, while he awaits grand jury
0
action.3
Also the Government's position in a case where the victim has been
released unharmed has been weakened by the principal decision. It
would seem that the Government must now grant the defendant all the
safeguards to which a defendant in a capital case is entitled even though
a capital penalty is not sought and cannot be obtained. This is contrary
to the congressional intent expressed in the Federal Rules which provide
such safeguards only when a defendant is on trial for his life. These
rules require the Government, in a capital case, to furnish to the defendant a list of veniremen and witnesses to be produced on the trial.
Since this list must be given three days prior to trial, the additional
burden of deciding and making known in advance what witnesses will
be called at the trial is placed on the Government. 31 Defendant will also
be entitled to twenty pre-emptory challenges as against ten granted a
32
defendant in a non-capital case.
North Carolina law requires a precise and comprehensive indictment
in all cases.3 3 The problem raised in the Smith case does not arise in
North Carolina because our kidnapping statute3 4 does not have the
aggravation provision found in the federal statute. A similar situation
is presented in North Carolina by the burglary statute3 r which provides
for different degrees of burglary and a graduated scale of punishment,
depending upon the degree alleged and proved. If the state seeks the
death penalty it must allege in the indictment that the dwelling was in
the actual occupation of a person at the time of the crime. Without
such averment the indictment is sufficient only for burglary in the
second degree regardless of the proof at trial.3 6
It is submitted that, although the decision in the principal case was
beneficial to the defendant at bar, it has weakened the procedural safeguards protecting defendants generally.37 Discovery and bills of particulars are at this time, and will continue to be, inadequate safeguards
so long as harm, when it exists, is held not to be an element of the
offense of kidnapping under the Lindberg Act. Defendant's ability to
prepare his defense will be greatly impaired if he must wait until the
Government has rested its case before he can know the full degree of
"360
U.S. at 14-15 (separate opinion).
18 U.S.C.
§3432 (1958).
"FED. R. CRIm. P. 24(b).

"State v. Eason, 242 N.C. 59, 86 S.E.2d 774 (1955) ; State v. Albarty, 238

N.C. 130, 76 S.E.2d 381 (1953).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39 (1953).
"N.C. Gai'r.
" State v. Fleming, 107 N.C. 905, 12 S.E. 131 (1890).
" 360 U.S. at 12 (separate opinion).

STAT.

§ 14-51 (1953).
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jeopardy to which his actions have exposed him. Perhaps the cause of
justice would have been better served by an adoption of the approach of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to the same case.88 That court held:
(1) since the victim was released unharmed the offense could not be
punishable by death and the defendant could waive indictment, (2) that
prosecution by information will be deemed a waiver of the Government's right to ask for the death penalty or for the jury to recommend
it, and (3) that, whether waiver is allowed or whether the prosecution
is to be by indictment, no evidence of harm can be introduced unless
such harm is previously alleged so that the defendant will be made completely aware of the gravity of the charge he faces.
W. TRAWis PORTER
Eminent Domain-Interest As an Element of Just Compensation
North Carolina recognizes the right of every property owner to
receive just compensation for property taken from him under the power
of eminent domain.' When land is taken under this power, the owner
is entitled to receive an amount equal to the value of the land on the
date of the taking.2 If payment is made later than the date of the taking,
then, when made it must include some additional sum as compensation
for the delay, 8 because the condemnee has had neither the legal right to
possession or use of his property nor the use of the money owed him
for the deprivation during this interval. 4 Failure to compensate for the
resulting loss would be unconstitutional. 5 Interest on the principal sum
from the date of the taking is used as a measuring stick for computing
the condemnee's damages resulting from delay in payment. 6 This right
'

1

Smith v. United States, 238 F.2d 925, 929-30 (5th Cir. 1956).

DeBruhl v. Highway Comm'n, 247 N.C. 671, 102 S.E.2d 229 (1958); Ivester

v. City of Winston-Salem, 215 N.C. 1, 1 S.E.2d 88 (1939); Johnston v. Rankin,
70 N.C. 550 (1874); see generally Comment, 35 N.C.L. Rav. 296 (1957).
'Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106 (1924); Braswell v.
Highway Comm'n, 250 N.C. 508, 108 S.E.2d 912 (1959) ; Western Carolina Power
Co. v. Hayes, 193 N.C. 104, 136 S.E. 363 (1927).
'United States v. 25.4 Acres of Land, 82 F. Supp. 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1949);
Abernathy v. South & W. Ry., 159 N.C. 340, 74 S.E. 890 (1912).
'United States v. Klamath and Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119 (1938); United
States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 51 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Wash. 1943); ArkansasMissouri Power Co. v. Hamlin, 288 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. App. 1956); Balkey v.
Commonwealth, 394 Pa. 166, 146 A.2d 297 (1958).
'United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585 (1947) ; Bergen
County Sewer Authority v. Little Ferry, 15 N.J. Super. 43, 83 A.2d 4 (1951);
In re Bronx River Parkway, 284 N.Y. 48, 29 N.E.2d 465 (1940); Annot., 36
A.L.R.2d 337, 428 (1954).
' "The concept of just compensation is comprehensive and includes all elements
....
The owner is not limited to the value of the property at the time of the
taking; 'he is entitled to such addition as will produce the full equivalent of that
value paid contemporaneously with the taking! Interest at a proper rate 'is a good
measure by which to ascertain the amount so to be added.'"
Jacobs v. United
States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
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to interest is not dependent on statutory provision or an express agreement between the parties, but is an integral part of the just compensation
7
due the owner.
The federal courts and a great majority of the state courts allow this
interest as a matter of strict constitutional right.8 It is usually considered either as payment for damages caused by detention of the compensation 9 or as payment necessary to produce a full equivalent of the
value of an award paid contemporaneously with the taking. There seems
to be no valid distinction between the two, since both are based on the
principle of remuneration for loss suffered during the interim. 10
North Carolina refuses to allow interest when the owner is permitted
to remain in possession and reap benefit from use of the land during
the interim period." 1 Thus in Yancey v. Highway Corn'n 1 2 where
the petitioners were permitted to harvest crops from the land for two
years after the date of. the original appropriation, the court held that
they were not entitled, as a matter of law, to have interest on the
amount of compensation fixed by the jury. In DeBruhl v. Highway
Com;nn,xS however, where the condemnee was completely deprived of
possession and derived no benefit during the interim, the court held that
he was entitled, ag a matter of law, to have the jury award interest on
the fair market value of the condemned property from the date of the
taking. Yancey was not overruled; it was expressly distinguished on
the ground that the owner in Yancey had derived benefit during the interim and consequently had suffered no 'compensable loss from the
delay in payment.' 4 -The DeBruhl decision was expressly followed in
Winston-Salem v.' Wellsx5 where interest was again allowed as a matter
of law.
It can be argued that the petitioners in Yancey did not receive just
compensation. Even if the owner is not completely deprived of possession at the time of condemnation his tenure is rendered precarious. All
7Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937) ; Danforth v. United
States, 102 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1939) see generally 29 C.J.S. Emitent Domah
§ 333(a) (1941) ; MILLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 175 (1879).
8 Kieselbach v. United States, 317 U.S.399 (1943) ; United States v. New York,
186 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Stubbs v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 1007 (M.D.N.C.
1938) ; Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. Key, 99 So. 2d 82 (La. 1958) ; Harrison
v. Louisiana, 11 So. 2d 612 (La. 1942) ; Sowma v. State, 121 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1953);

see generally Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 337, 428-35 (1954).

'See, e.g., DeBruhl v. Highway Comm'n, 247 N.C. 671, 102 S.E.2d 229 (1958).
10 See JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN § 176 (1953); 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER
EMINENT DOMAIN §5 (2d ed. 1953) ; 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 176(a) (1941).
"Abernathy v. South-& W. Ry., 159 N.C. 340, 74 S.E. 890 (1912). Right of
way was condemned over property on which rental houses were located, but plaintiff had continued to rent the houses. The court held that the jury could have
given interest as part of the damages if the circumstances had warranted, but
since no decrease in rent was shown interest was not warranted.
"221 N.C. 185, 19 S.E.2d 489 (1942).
1 247 N.C. 671, 102 S.E.2d 229
1,1
Id.at 684, 102 S.E.2d at 238.

(1958).

15249 N.C. 148, 105 S.E.2d 435 (1959).
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rights in this property can be exercised only under doubt and uncertainty as to their duration. It is submitted that it is not necessary for
the court either to allow or disallow interest depending upon whether
or not the owner has remained in possession and reaped benefit. It
would seem to be a better rule for the court to allow interest, as a matter of law, in every case where payment is delayed. In cases where the
landowner has received benefit from retained possession after the date
of appropriation, the court could simply set off the value he has derived
from such retention against the amount of interest allowed as a matter
of law. This rule would facilitate uniformity in the court's decisions and
would guarantee to the owner the just compensation to which he is
entitled, while preventing any over-compensation to which the owner
has no constitutional right. There is supporting authority for this
method in both North Carolina 16 and other jurisdictions. 17
Suppose that in a condemnation proceeding the court awards a judgment which includes compensation for delay in payment, i.e., interest,
in addition to an amount equivalent to the value of the land at the date
of the taking. If this judgment is not paid forthwith, is the condemnee
entitled to interest on the judgment? Where the condemnor is not a
governmental entity, North Carolina allows him to recover interest on
the judgment by statute.' 8 However, where the condemnor is the state
or an agency of the state the cases are not in agreement as to whether
or not interest on the judgment should be allowed. A brief survey of
the cases in this jurisdiction which have dealt with this issue will serve
to indicate an apparent inconsistency in result when the condemnor is
the state or a state agency.
City of Durham v. Davis'9 appears to have been the first case dealing
with the issue of interest on a judgment rendered in condemnation proceedings against the state or a state agency. In this case the court
awarded the condemnee interest from the rendition of the judgment. In
so doing it cited no authorities and apparently took the view that
interest on a judgment should be awarded as a matter of course. The
court obviously was not impressed with the fact that the condemnor-city
" Cf. Miller v. City of Asheville, 112 N.C. 759, 16 S.E. 762 (1893). In this

case instruction to the jury, that it should allow interest on such sum as it might
assess as damages from the time of the condemnation, but should take into consideration the use made of and benefit received by the plaintiffs from the land after
such date against the damages, was held to be correct
" United States v. Holden, 268 Fed. 223 (D.C.N.Y. 1920) ; Application of Great
Lakes Pipe Line Co., 168 Kan. 100, 211 P.2d 70 (1949) ; Pattison v. Buffalo, R. &
P. Ry., 268 Pa. 555, 112 Atl. 101 (1920); West v. Milwaukee, L.S. & W. Ry.,
56 Wis. 318, 14 N.W. 392 (1882); see generally 2 LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 499 (2d ed. 1900) ; MILLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 175 (1879).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-5 (1953). "[T]he amount of any judgment... rendered or adjudged in any kind of action ... shall bear interest till paid."
19171 N.C. 305, 88 S.E. 433 (1916).
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was a governmental entity.
Some twenty-six years later, however, in
Yancey v. Highway Coma'n2' interest on a judgment against an agency
of the state, previously rendered in the first Yancey case, heretofore
discussed, was denied. The court in reaching this decision relied on the
established principle that "the State, unless by or pursuant to an explicit
statute, is not liable for interest, even on a sum certain which is overdue
and unpaid. ' '22 The next case of importance was Highway Comrn'n v.
Privett23 which expressly recognized Yancey second as controlling and
did not allow interest.
In the recent case of Board of Educ. v. McMillan24 the court, relying
on City of Durham v. Davis, allowed interest on the judgment. The
majority opinion did not mention Yancey second or Privett but again
seemed to allow interest as a matter of course. Justice Parker in his
concurring opinion, on the other hand, felt that the instant case had
disemboweled the Yancey secon d decision without expressly referring
to it. He advocated administering "the coup de grace to the Yancey
decision by specifically overruling it.' '2 He stated that "the decision is
wrong, and does violence to Article 1,§ 17, of the State Constitution,
and to the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.!2
It is submitted that McMillan does, in fact, overrule Yancey second
as the concurring opinion suggests. Even assuming that Yancey second
and Privatt can be distinguished from Davis and McMillan on the
ground that the condemnors in the former cases were agencies of the
state7 while in the latter the condemnors were municipal corporations,28
2' Municipal corporations such as counties and incorporated cities and towns are
instrumentalities of the state for the more convenient administration of local
government. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); Gaud v.
Walker, 214 S.C. 451, 53 S.E.2d 316 (1949).
(Hereafter referred to as Yancey second).
2 21222 N.C. 106, 22 S.E.2d 256 (1942)
d. at 109, 22 S.E.2d at 259, quoting United States v. North Carolina, 136
U.S. 211, 219 (1890). The court held that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-5 was not applicable because the state is not bound by a statute unless expressly mentioned therein.
This fteedom from liability for interest is based on the principle of sovereignty.
United States v. North American Transp. & Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330 (1920).
Sovereignty in this interpretation is a carry-over from the common law idea that
"the King can do no wrong" and as such is also the basis for the principle of
sovereign immunity from suit, absent consent. See generally Borchard, Theories of
Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926).
2-3246 N.C. 501, 99 S.E.2d 61 (1957).
24250 N.C. 485, 108 S.E.2d 895 (1959).
25
Id. at 492, 108 S.E.2d at 900.
2 250 N.C. at 492, 108 S.E.2d at 900.
27 The State Highway Commission is not a municipal corporation but an agency
of the state created for the purpose of exercising administrative and governmental
functions. See Independence Trust Co. v. Porter & Boyd, Inc., 190 N.C. 680, 130
S.E. 547 (1925).
28 A school district is a municipal corporation.
See Perry v. Commissioners of
Franklin County, 148 N.C. 521, 62 S.E. 608 (1908) ; Smith v. School Trustees, 141
N.C. 143, 53 S.E. 524 (1906).
The suggested distinction would not seem to constitute an adequate basis for
denying interest on judgments against the state and allowing it as against a municipal corporation, because a city theoretically enjoys the same immunity from
suit, absent consent, as does the state. See Note, 36 N.C.L. Ray. 97 n. 4 (1957).
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Yancey second and Privett should fall on constitutional grounds. The
14th Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that a
state cannot take private property for public use without awarding just
compensation. 29 North Carolina recognizes this right to just compensation as an integral part of the law of the land and declares that law
of the land and due process are synonymous.8 0 Interest, as compensation for delay in payment, is an essential element of just compensation. 3 '
It is contended that there is no substantial difference between delay in
payment of the principal sum due the owner of condemned land and
delay in payment of the judgment rendered on that sum, delay in either
case being simply a description of the interval existing between the date
of the taking and the date of payment. Consequently, interest on the
judgment until final payment, compensating for this delay, is constitutionally guaranteed. The general rule that a state or state agency is not
liabilirequired to pay interest should, therefore, be held inapplicable 3 to
2
ties arising from the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
RICHARD S. JONES, JR.

Insurance-Insurer's Liability for Death or Loss Resulting
from Violation of Law
A felon flees the scene of a burglary with the police in hot pursuit.
In the chase his wife's car is wrecked and he is injured. Under the
wife's accident insurance policy covering the driver and containing no
exception for injuries sustained in violation of law, may he recover his
medical expenses? The Supreme Court of Michigan, in Davis v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch.,' said that he could. Recovery was allowed
in the absence of a provision in the policy excepting the risk and in the absence of proof that the policy had been obtained in contemplation of the
commission of a felony. The court further stated that this construction
would not encourage crime or be contrary to public policy.
A vigorous dissent argued that generally one may not recover when
the crime involved is one of moral turpitude. Since the policy provided
" Slattery Co. v. United States, 231 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1956); Creasy v.
Stevens, 160 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Pa. 1958) ; Riden v. Philadelphia, B. & W.R.R.,
182 Md. 336, 35 A.2d 99 (1943) ; Spaugh v. City of Winston-Salem, 234 N.C. 708,
68 S.E.2d 838 (1952); Board of Educ. v. Campbells Creek R.R., 138 W. Va.
473, 76 S.E.2d 271 (1953) ; see generally 18 Am. JuL.Eminent Domain § 4 (1938).
11 E.T. & W.N.C. Transp. Co. v. Currie, 248 N.C. 560, 104 S.E.2d 403 (1958) ;
Sale v. Highway Comm'n, 242 N.C. 612, 89 S.E.2d 290 (1955) ; Eason v. Spence,
232 N.C. 579, 61 S.E.2d 717 (1950).
" Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299 (1923) ; see generally

1 ORGEL, op. cit. .stpranote 10, § 6.

" See United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48 (1951) ; United

States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585 (1947) ; Smyth v. United
States, 302 U.S. 329 (1937); Highway Comm'n v. Stupenti, 222 Ark. 9, 257
S.W.2d 37 (1953) ; Sholars v. Highway Comm'n, 6 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 1942).
1356 Mich. 454, 96 N.W.2d 760 (1959).
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payment "to and for each person who sustains bodily injury," the recovery here was for the felon, and this was not a case involving an
innocent beneficiary. Noting the distinction between conduct which is
malum in se (wrong by its very nature) and that which is malum prohibitum (wrong only because prohibited), the dissent rejected the
majority's reliance on Bowman v. Preferred Risk Mtt. Ins. Co. 2 as
precedent. That case allowed recovery under a policy containing no
exclusionary clause, but there the conduct was clearly not a crime of
moral turpitude. The insured had committed a simple trespass on
another's automobile. Perhaps the strongest reason presented for denying recovery was that if the policy had expressly purported to cover
such a risk, it would have been void on the grounds of public policy.
The two lines of thought set out by the majority and the dissent in
the principal case illustrate the inconsistencies of the law in this area. 8
In many cases recovery has been denied entirely on the ground that
the loss was not within the terms of the policy. Such cases are, for the
most part, excluded from this discussion unless they throw some light
on the weight given by a particular court to circumstances outside of
the policy itself.
It has been held that death resulting from execution for murder
does not avoid the insurer's liability under a life policy with an incontestability clause, notwithstanding the argument that such payment
would be contrary to public policy.4 Recovery has been allowed where
the insured was killed by two peace officers while he was committing a
robbery, on the ground, inter alia, that death is the thing insured against,
and the risk includes human foibles.5 The beneficiary has been allowed
recovery where the insured was killed: by police, while attempting a
hold-up;6 by his intended murder and robbery victim;7 by a homeowner, while attempting to flee from a burglary ;8 by a fire he set deliberately to collect on a fire insurance policy ;o when his car overturned
while he was fleeing from police officers who had attempted to stop him
2348 Mich. 531, 83 N.W.2d 434 (1957).

'There is one class of cases about which there is very little disagreement. The
great weight of authority today allows recovery by a beneficiary when the insured
commits suicide and the policy makes no exclusionary reference thereto. 2
RIcirA

s, IxsuRANcE

§240

(1952).

"John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Tarrance, 244 F.2d 86 (6th Cir. 1957).
'Home State Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 175 Okla. 492, 53 P.2d 562 (1936).
'Domico v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 215, 253 N.W. 538 (1934).
'McDonald v. Order of Triple Alliance, 57 Mo. App. 87, 90 (1894), where the
court said, "[T]he insurer takes the subject insured, with his flesh, blood, and
passions."
'Jordan v. Logia Supreme De La Alianza Hispano-Americana, 23 Ariz. 584,
206 Pac. 162 (1922).
Taylor v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 11 Ill. 2d 227, 142 N.E2d 5

(1957).
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for questioning;1 by adulterated boot-leg whiskey;" and by complications resulting from submission to an abortion. 12
Almost every court allowing recovery has to deal with the argument that recovery would be against public policy. Judgment for the
plaintiff thus usually involves a finding that recovery is not repulsive
to public policy. There are several more positive grounds generally
relied upon by courts allowing recovery. Many courts find that since
there is no exclusion clause in the policy, there is no reason to read
into the policy what the insurer did not write into it.13 Where the plaintiff is an innocent beneficiary; many courts reason that recovery does
not violate the maxim that no man should be allowed to benefit from
his own wrong-doing and, further, that an innocent beneficiary ought
not suffer for another's wrong.14 In tne Bowman case, relied upon by
the majority in the principal case, the Michigan court justified the
plaintiff's recovery on the grounds that the crime involved was very
minor-a misdemeanor at most-and as such should not be a bar to
the insured's claim. It has also been argued that recovery will not act
as an inducement to crime.' 5
Courts have refused recovery where the insured died from blood
poisoning contracted by the use of a hypodermic, possession of which
was a statutory misdemeanor 16 and where the insured was legally executed for murder.Y. A frequent justification for denying the insurer's
liability is that recovery would be against public policy.' 8 Directly
related to this is the argument that what the policy could not expressly
insure against, it cannot impliedly insure against.'2 It is stated or at
least implicit in all of these cases that for recovery to be denied the
death or injury must be the proximate result of the insured's violation
of the law.
The first North Carolina case in this area, Spruill v. North Carolina
Mu,t. Life Ins. Co., 20 held that the insurer's liability was not avoided by
the fact that the insured was a run-away slave, killed while resisting
" Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Henkel, 234 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1956).
"Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Flickinger, 33 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1929).
'"Payne v. Louisiana Indus. Life Ins. Co., 33 So. 2d 444 (La. 1948).
'.' See, e.g., Home State Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 175 Okla. 492, 53 P.2d 562

(1936).

""See, e.g., Taylor v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 11 11. 2d. 227, 142

N.E.2d 5 (1957).

" Home State Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 175 Okla. 492, 53 P.2d 562, 563 (1936).
"It is not to be presumed that policy holders as a class, or any appreciable number
of them, will go out and seek death in unlawful pursuits in order to mature their
policies."
" Townsend v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 188 App. Div. 370,

177 N.Y. Supp. 68 (1919).
Simmons v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 641 (M.D. Pa. 1954).
Acme Fin. Co. v. National Ins. Co., 188 Colo. 445, 195 P.2d 728 (1948).
10

Townsend v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 188 App. Div. 370, 177

N.Y. Supp. 68 (1919).
2-46 N.C. 126 (1853).
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apprehension by a posse. The court interpreted the exclusion from
liability for death "by the hands of justice" to mean "by some judicial
sentence for the commission of some felony" and allowed recovery by
the beneficiary.
When the insured was lawfully killed in a fight in which he was the
unlawful aggressor, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in Clay v. State
Ins. Co.,21 denied recovery for death "by accidental means." The
policy excluded liability where the insured was killed while violating
the law. This would seem to put the case outside the scope of this
note. The court, however, stated a rule which merits mention: "[T]he
true test of liability in cases of this character is whether the insured,
being in the wrong, was the aggressor, under circumstances that would
render a homicide likely as the result of his own misconduct. 2 2 The
decision appeared to place very little stress on the exclusion cause, with
emphasis on the stated rule as it related to death "by accidental means."
At least two North Carolina cases, Fallins v. Durham Life Ins. Co.28
and Scarborough v. World Ins. Co.,24 both involving insurance against
death by accidental means, have since decided the question of the insurer's liability on the basis of the Clay rule.
The next important case in which our court set down a rule in this
area, Poole v. Imperial Mut. Life & Health Ins. Co.,25 involved an
injury insured suffered while riding without permission on a freight train,
a statutory misemeanor.2 6 In allowing recovery the court took notice
of the fact that the policy contained no exclusion clause for violations
of law. It further stated that the right of recovery should not be affected
by the unlawful conduct of the plaintiff unless it was so reckless or
occurred under such circumstances as to remove the injury from that
classification of events called "accidents," and so withdraw it from the
effects of the policy.
The next important case, Blackwell v. National Fire Ins. Co.,2 7
a property insurance case, held that an insured could recover for damage
to his automobile which resulted when he attempted to escape arrest
while transporting intoxicating liquor, a misdemeanor.2 8 The per curiam
opinion stated several reasons for affirming the judgment for plaintiff.
The policy contained no exclusion clause and the loss came within the
terms of the policy. The insurance contract bad no direct connection
with the violation, but was merely collateral thereto. There was no
22
21174 N.C. 642, 94 S.E. 289 (1917).
Id.at 645, 94 S.E. at 290.
23247 N.C. 72, 100 S.E.2d 214 (1957). The insured was killed by an outsider,
attempting to break up a fight. Citing Clay, the court pointed out that here there
was no showing that insured was an aggressor. Recovery was allowed.
24244 N.C. 502, 94 S.E.2d 558 (1956). Here the facts were nearly identical to
Clay, in that the insured was killed in an act of unlawful aggression. Citing Clay,
the court refused recovery to the beneficiary.
2 188 N.C. 468, 125 S.E. 8 (1924).
20 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 60-104 (1950).
27 234 N.C. 559, 67 S.E2d 750 (1951).
28 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18-49.3 (1953).
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evidence of loss by any intentional act of the insured. This is the only
North Carolina case the writer could find comparable to the principal
case and it seems readily distinguishable on the basis of the felonymisdemeanor distinction. In the principal case the conduct of the
insured was quite clearly malum in se, being the felony of burglary.
By contrast, in the North Carolina case insured's actions were at worst
a misdemeanor, and wrong only because prohibited by statute.
From the foregoing it seems safe to conclude that the decisionsconsidering the nation as a whole-show a lack of coherence. The courts
seem inclined to make their decisions rather summarily, relying upon
one or two of at least a dozen different reasons to justify the particular
holding. It is suggested that there is a perspective, which none of the
courts have appeared to use, that might prove helpful in clarifying this
area of the law.
Anglo-American law has never been amenable to the use of rigid
formulae in determining the outcome of particular cases. This proposal is in no way intended to conflict with that tradition. It is suggested, not as a pigeon-hole system of disposing of cases, but rather as
a consistent perspective from which to view the circumstances in any
given case.
Some of the preceding decisions have been based at least in part
upon the seriousness of the violation of law involved, others upon a
consideration of proper treatment of the innocent beneficiary, and still
others upon the maxim that no one shall profit from his own wrong.
It is urged that all three of these elements ought to be considered as
crucial in the determination of any such case where the loss is within
the terms of the insurance contract. These elements, in combination,
create four distinct types of cases:
I. Where it is the insured himself who will benefit from the
recovery, and the violation was malum in se.
II. Where the insured will benefit, and the violation was malum
prohibitum.
III. Where the beneficiary will benefit from the recovery, and the
violation was malum in se.
IV. Where the beneficiary will benefit, and the violation was
malum prohibitum.
In Class I, the overbearing consideration ought to be that no man
be allowed to profit from his own wrong when that wrong is a serious
crime against society. Just as clearly, in Class IV a completely innocent beneficiary ought not to be deprived of the benefits of a policy
merely because of a minor infraction of the law by another. It is
Classes II and III which present the most difficult questions. Here the
courts must "balance the equities" and choose consciously between two
opposing social policies. To decide cases falling into Class II, the courts
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must choose between withholding recovery, thereby punishing the
violator, and labeling the violation as too inconsequential to merit so
severe a sanction. In the opinion of this writer, the preferable choice
here is to allow recovery, on the ground that by its very nature an act
malum prohibitum is not so repugnant to society as to warrant denying
the insured recompense for his injuries. In Class III cases the courts
must determine whether the needs of society and the law will be better
served by compensating an innocent beneficiary or by providing another
sanction for serious crime. Again the writer would approve recovery,
primarily because of the beneficiary's insulation from the wrongful act.
The principal case, viewed from this suggested perspective, becomes
a questionable decision. It was the felon who was to benefit directly
from the proceeds of a recovery. His crime was unquestionably malum
in se. As a Class I case, it would have been better decided in favor of
the defendant insurer.
A brief glance backward reveals that none of the North Carolina
cases fall into Class I. Only one case, Fallinsv. DurhamLife Ins. Co.,2 9
can be fitted into Class IV. That case allowed recovery to the innocent
beneficiary and thus reaches the same result as the proposal. Both of
the cases which fit into Class II, Blackwell v. National Fire Ins. Co.3 0
and Poole v. Imperial Mut. Life & Health Ins. Co.,31 are in harmony
with the proposal. In each the violation amounted to no more than a
misdemeanor. In each of them our court granted recovery to the insured in spite of his violation of the law. Two of the decisions, Scarborough v. World Ins. Co. 82 and Clay v. State Ins. Co., 83 fit into Class
III and are in conflict with the writer's proposal in that they deny
recovery to an innocent beneficiary because of the gravity of the in84
sured's conduct. While Spruill v. North Carolina Mit. Ins. Co.
might be said to fall into Class III also, the writer prefers not to attempt
to categorize the morality of running away from slavery, a point long
since mooted.
None of the North Carolina cases which lend themselves to the
proposed analysis have been on all fours with the principal case. Considering the language used by our court in related cases, stressing the
seriousness of the crime involved or the nature of the insured's conduct
in general, the court, if presented with a case like the principal case,
should have no difficulty following the demands of logic and the best
societal policy to a conclusion contrary to that reached by the Michigan
court.
BARRY T. WINSTON
20
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Real Party in Interest-Insurance-Partially Subrogated
Insurer's Standing To Sue
In Southeastern FireIns. Co. v. Moore' the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that payment by an insurance company of the damage done
to insured's car, less fifty dollars deductible under the policy terms, did
not entitle the insurer to sue the third party tort-feasor in its own name.
The court found that the insurer had sought "to split an indivisible
cause of action" and that it was not the real party in interest. Also, the
insured had received the money in the form of a "loan" repayable only
in the event of his recovery from the tort-feasor, and the court intimated
that this arrangement was not a payment entitling the insurer to subrogation.
Under common law rules of pleading, all actions had to be main2
tained in the name of the person whose legal right had been affected.
So, in a tort case, only the injured party himself could be the plaintiff.
Subsequently, code pleading and the Federal Rules adopted real party
in interest provisions embodying the practice followed in equity of allowing any person with a substantial beneficial interest in the claim to sue
in his own name.3 Under these provisions, including the North Carolina statute,4 the following rules are applied. When an insurer pays an
insured's claim on a policy it becomes subrogated pro tanto to any right
of action which the insured may have against a third party responsible
for the loss. 5 When the insurer has paid the entire loss sustained, the
insured having no further beneficial interest in the claim, the former
may sue the tort-feasor in its own name.6 However, the rule against
splitting a cause of action requires that the legal title to the right of
action for the entire claim must remain in the insured when the payment
by the insurer does not cover the whole loss. 7 Upon recovery, the insured
holds all proceeds in excess of the previously uncompensated amount of
1250 N.C. 351, 108 S.E.2d 618 (1959).

§ 24 (2d ed. 1947).
op. cit. supra note 2, § 21; 3 MooaE, FEDR...L

2 CLARK, CODE PLEADING
CLARK,

ed. 1948).

PRACTrCE

17.03 (2d

'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-57 (1953). The real party in interest must have some
interest in the subject matter of the litigation, and not merely an interest in the
action itself. Choate Rental Co. v. justice, 211 N.C. 54, 188 S.E. 609 (1936).
r CLARK, op. cit. supra note 2, § 24; 3 MooPE, op. cit. supra note 3, 1 17.09;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-176 (1950).
1 Burgess v. Trevathan, 236 N.C. 157, 72 S.E.2d 231 (1952) ; Service Fire Ins.
Co. v. Horton Motor Lines, Inc., 225 N.C. 588, 35 S.E.2d 879 (1945); Powell &
Powell, Inc. v. Wake Water Co., 171 N.C. 290, 88 S.E. 426 (1916) ; Cunningham
& Hinshaw v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 139 N.C. 427, 51 S.E. 1029 (1905) ; CLARK,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 24; 3 MooaE op. cit. svpra note 3, 17.09.
7Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. United States, 171 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1948) ; Burgess v.
Trevathan, mupra note 6; Powell & Powell, Inc. v. Wake Water Co., supra note 6;
29 Am. JuR. Insurance § 1358 (1940) ; 46 C.J.S. Insurance § 1211 (1946) ; CLARK,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 24; 3 MooRn, op. cit. vipra note 3, 1117.09.
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The latter rule is designed to pro-

tect the tort-feasor from the inconvenience and expense of being forced
to defend against more than one action for a single indivisible wrong.
There remains a problem when an insurer finds it necessary or advisable
to sue the tort-feasor in the company name when it has not paid the
full amount of the insured's lossY The question, then, is how the insurer can secure a surrender of all beneficial interest in the claim from
the insured and vest the title of real party in interest in itself.
Generally, there are two methods by which this may be done. First,
assignment appears to provide the surest and most practical solution
to the problem. Whether an assignment to the insurer of the insured's
entire right of action is made for additional consideration or not, such
an assignment will enable the insurer to sue for the full amount of the
loss.10 Care must be taken in drawing an assignment without further
consideration to specify that the assignment is absolute and final and
that the assignor (insured) has forever parted with all beneficial interest
in the claim to be litigated. This is necessary to avoid the possibility
that the assignment be found to be one for collection only and thus
invalid in North Carolina. 1 Another caveat should be observed if the
assignment is in exchange for additional consideration. It should be
made clear that the insurer is purchasing the insured's claim, and not
making an additional payment pursuant to the policy. The latter would

presumably constitute a payment in excess of the insurance contract
'Powell & Powell, Inc. v. Wake Water Co., 171 N.C. 290, 88 S.E. 426 (1916).
But cf. Patitucci v. Gerhardt, 206 Wis. 358, 240 N.W. 385 (1932), where the court
held that the trial judge should always join the insurer whenever the latter's
existence in the case comes to the judge's attention, though it is not reversible
error to fail to do so.
' This problem may arise where the insured has for some reason left the state
after the accident and, after being informed of the need for his co-operation, fails
to co-operate with the insurer. Plaintiff's attorney informed this writer that the
insured in the principal case, while still within the state and legally bound by the
"loan" agreement to co-operate, was reluctant to participate even to the small
extent of signing the verification. Perhaps such reluctance may be appreciated
when it is considered that the most the insured can realize from a recovery against
the tort-feasor would be the deductible amount not covered by the insurance minus,
usually, one-third which the insurer keeps for the expense of prosecuting the
action. For obvious reasons it is not advisable to compel the insurer's primary
witness to join in the action against his will.
"0General Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Carp, 176 So. 145 (La. 1937).
"Federal Reserve Bank v. Whitford, 207 N.C. 267, 176 S.E. 584 (1934) ; Bank

v. Rochamora, 193 N.C. 1, 136 S.E. 259 (1927); Martin v. Mask, 158 N.C. 436,

74 S.E. 343 (1912). See generally 3 M'ooRE, op. cit. supra note 3, 17.09, where
Professor Moore comments that states following this rule have given substantive
effect to the real party in interest provision where only procedural effect was intended by the original code-drafters. Under the Federal Rules an assignee for
collection only is the real party in interest. Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, 111 F.2d
406 (2d Cir. 1940). Where such assignment is to a partial subrogee, the North
Carolina rule would seem by implication to treat the respective claims of insurer
and insured as separate causes of action. There appear to be no North Carolina
cases directly in point.
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and would be a violation of the anti-discrimination provision of the
state's insurance laws.' 2
The other method involves the permissive splitting of a cause of
action, which may be done in several ways. Generally, this can be
accomplished only with the consent of the defendant. While it can be
assumed that he will not consent if it would leave him liable to face
prosecution in more than one suit for a single tort, it is possible to split
13
the cause and still give him protection against multiplicity of suits.

The insured can give the tort-feasor a release or a covenant not to sue
for the uncompensated part of the claim. By accepting the release or
covenant the tort-feasor consents to the splitting, but since the insured
is now barred he will have to face only one suit for the loss.' The consideration for the covenant or release can be any nominal amount if
the tort-feasor is unwilling to pay the insured the actual amount of his
uncompensated loss. It is essential that such a release clearly recite
that only the part of the loss not covered by insurance is to be released.
A release of the entire claim may result in a complete bar to action by
either the insured or the insurer against the tort-feasor.r5 For this
reason it may be safer from the standpoint of the insurer to have the
insured use a covenant, which is only a bar to suit by the covenantor
(insured) rather than a bar to action on the claim itself. 16
In Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Horton Motor Lines,"t a case similar to
the principal one, the insurer commenced an action in its own name
against the tort-feasor just prior to the running of the statute of limiN.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-44.3, -198 (1950). Quaere, what is the difference,
'

other than in form, between a payment in excess of the insurance contract and a
purchase by insurer of insured's claim, when the net result in either case would be
to vest the real party in interest title in the insurer?
" This is not to say, however, that the defendant cannot waive his right to this
protection. This may be done by filing answers on the merits to separate complaints of the insurer and insured or simply by failing to enter a timely objection
to the standing to sue of the insurer in a separate action by the latter. In failing
to object the defendant impliedly consents to a splitting of the cause of action.
Southern Stock Fire Ins. Co. v. Southern Ry., 179 N.C. 290, 102 S.E. 504 (1920).
" Powell & Powell, Inc. v. Wake Water Co., 171 N.C. 290, 88 S.E. 426 (1916);
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Wabash Ry., 74 Mo. App. 106 (1898).
" Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 165 N.C. 136, 80 S.E. 1069
(1914), held that insurer was barred from suing the tort-feasor who had paid a
judgment held by the insured for the entire loss. Powell & Powell, Inc. v. Wake
Water Co., supra note 14, held that where tort-feasor has knowledge of insurer's
rights prior to settlement, such release will be effective only as to insured's uncompensated loss, unless the payment was in excess of this loss, in which case the
release would be a defense pro tanto to the extent of the excess amount paid. But
see Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 230 Mo. App. 468,
91 S.W.2d 227 (1936), where insurer was barred even though tort-feasor had
knowledge of subrogation rights prior to the settlement with insured. Contra,
Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Bleem, 132 Misc. 22, 227 N.Y. Supp. 746 (Buffalo City
Ct. 1928) ; Brighthope Ry. v. Rogers, 76 Va. 443 (1881). These cases held that
a release of tort-feasor by insured after subrogation had occurred is ineffective as
a release of insurer's claim, regardless of notice to tort-feasor.
26 Cal. 2d 705, 160 P.2d 783 (1945).
" Pellett v. Sonotone Corp.,879
17
(1945),
225 N.C. 588, 35 S.E.2d
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tations. The defendant demurred on the ground that the insurer was
not the real party in interest. After the statutory period had expired
the insurer's motion to join the insured as a party plaintiff was granted.
On appeal the court sustained the overruling of the demurrer on the
ground that the statute of limitations is a plea in bar and may not be
raised by demurrer. Although not put in issue by the demurrer, the
following questions were present: When a partially subrogated insurer
institutes an action in its own name before the statute of limitations has
run, does the subsequent barring of the insured's claim by the statute
also leave the insurer barred? Or does the expiration of the statute
period result in the insurer becoming the "only party having an enforceable claim' 18 and thus the legal real party in interest? An affirmative
answer to the first question would be predicated upon the contention
that the insurer was not the real party in interest before the statute ran
and that the subsequent barring of the insured's claim should in no
way alter that fact. Accordingly, under the doctrine of derivative rights
of subrogation, the subrogee (insurer) should accede to no greater
rights than those of the subrogor (insured), who would be barred by
the statute. An affirmative answer to the second question perhaps could
be sustained by reasoning that after the statute has run the insurer holds
the only legally enforceable claim against which the tort-feasor could
be forced to defend. Therefore, the defendant would be afforded the
same protective rights embodied in the rule against splitting a cause of
action and would not have to face a multiplicity of suits. Unfortunately,
the court here did not meet this issue, 19 and it has not yet been decided
in this state. Although the latter position apparently has been accepted
by one federal court,20 it would not appear safe to rely solely upon this
method to vest the real-party title in a partially subrogated insurer.
However, if no alternative were available, it might be argued as a last
resort to avert the possibility of leaving the insurer remedyless in statuteof-limitation cases.
There is one other procedure possibly available to the insurer, that
of waiver by the insured of his right in the claim. The plaintiff in the
principal case endeavored to invoke this doctrine against the defendant's
contention that the insurer was not the real party in interest. 21 In a
sworn affidavit, the insured expressly "disavowed any interest in said
2Id. at 591, 35 S.E.2d at 881.
1In
regard to the plaintiff-insurer's right to sue in its own name after the

running of the statute, the court, through Justice Barnhill, said: "What the respective rights of the parties may be in the event it is made to appear . . . that
Medlin's [the insured's] claim for damages, in part, is still outstanding and unsatisfied, but his right of action is barred by the statute of limitations, so that the
plaintiff [insurer] is now the only party having an enforceable claim, must be
reserved for decision at the trial below. The facts there developed will control the
ruling of the court" Ibid.
"' Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. United States, 171 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1948).
21 250 N.C. at 352, 108 S.E.2d at 618.
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cause of action" and further declared "that she has no interest in this
cause of action and that the sole remaining interest to be determined...
is that of the Southeastern Fire Insurance Company .... -22 It was
argued that the following testimony of the insured in open court under
oath also constituted a waiver: "I have not filed any suit in connection
with this automobile accident; I do not presently have any interest in
'23
it."
The plaintiff contended that if the current action were allowed to

proceed to judgment through reliance upon these statements by the
insured, then the insured would be estopped to institute any subsequent
action against the defendant. The court, while it apparently recognized
the plaintiff's contention, 24 did not discuss the question of waiver in
its opinion. Thus, the criteria by which the court will be guided in
this area remain unknown. If this jurisdiction is to allow such a waiver
at all, it is difficult to envision a more appropriate opportunity for its
application than that presented by the principal case. Waiver of rights
ranging from those established under ordinary contracts and tort claims
to those granted by the Constitution of the United States are frequently
permitted under proper circumstances.2 5 There appears to be no valid
reason why waiver by the insured in the situation at hand should not
be allowed.
There is some language in the opinion of the principal case2 6 which
indicates that the court may have based its decision in part upon the
"loan receipt" 27 signed by the insured. The original purpose for the
use of the "loan" device by insurance companies was to prevent the real
party in interest title from leaving the insured and vesting in the insurer
upon full payment of the insured's loss. 2 8 The assumption was that the
23Id. at 19.
-2Record, p. 13.
"250 N.C. at 352, 108 S.E.2d at 618.
"Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930) (waiver of a constitutional
right); Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Hutchins, 65 Minn. 89, 67 N.W. 807
(1896) (waiver of right under a contract) ; People v. Brady, 257 App. Div. 1000,
13 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1939) (waiver of a right under the statute of limitations);
Pascal v. Burke Transit Co., 229 N.C. 435, 50 S.E.2d 534 (1948). Cf. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-10 (1946), wherein the North Carolina Workman's Compensation Act
provides that if the employer of the injured employee does not sue the third party
tort-feasor within six months after the date-of the injury, he waives this right,
and the employee may bring the action himself, although the employer will still
share in the recovery.
" The court, through Justice Denny, quoted with approval 46 C.J.S. Insurance
§ 1209 (1946) : "Insurer's rights to subrogation accrue on payment of the insurance
claim; but until payment of the claim on the policy no rights to subrogation accrue.
An advance by insurer of the amount of insurance to insured under an agreement
reciting that the amount was received as a loan to be repaid only from such recovery as might be had from the other party is not a payment entitling the insurer
to subrogation." 250 N.C. at 354, 108 S.E.2d at 620.
" The receipt read, in part: "Received from the Southeastern Fire Insurance
Company the sum of Four Hundred Sixty-One and 96/100 Dollars ($461.96) as a
loan, without interest, repayable only in the event and to the extent of any net
recovery the insured may make from any person

Record, addendum, p. 1.
" Annot., 157 A.L.R. 1261 (1945).

. . .

liable for the loss ....
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use of the insured's name would result in a more sympathetic treatment
0
by the jury than if the insurance company itself brought the action."
Where the insurance covers the entire loss, the question of who is the
real party in interest may depend upon whether there as been in fact a
loan or a full payment.3 0 However, this loan device is of very doubtful
utility in the case of a claim arising under an automobile collision policy
containing a deductible clause. Regardless of whether the insurer has
paid or loaned the amount of the damage, less the deductible figure,
the court will require the use of the insured's name as the real party in
interest 3 ' unless one of the procedures outlined above is employed to
vest this title in the insurer.
ALLAN W. MARKHAM

Torts-Insulating Negligence in North Carolina
The doctrine of insulating negligence and the task of predicting how
the court will hold in an intervening negligence situation continue to be
problems in North Carolina. The issue of insulation arises when one
party through a negligent act or omission has created an unreasonable
risk of harm to others and a second actor through a subsequent act or
omission brings the risk to reality to the injury of the plaintiff. The
problem is whether the two tort-feasors may be held jointly liable or
whether the first tort-feasor is insulated by the later negligence of the
second tort-feasor. Our court has said that the problem of insulating
negligence is one of proximate cause' and that the test is whether the
-"Quaere, whether this assumption is valid today where often there is an insurer behind the plaintiff in automobile damage suits, and most jurors are aware
of this fact.
"In Cumingham & Hinshaw v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 139 N.C. 427, 51 S.E.
1029 (1905), it was determined by the jury that the "loan" was in fact a full and
final payment of the plaintiff-insured's claim by the insurer, thereby divesting the
insured of any standing to sue on the claim. Contra, Sosnow, Kranz & Simcoe,
Inc. v. Storatti Corp., 269 App. Div. 122, 54 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1945), where a suit
in the insured's name under a similar loan agreement was permitted, as it did not
prejudice the defendant, i.e., it would not allow the plaintiff a double recovery nor
make the defendant liable to multiple suits for the same wrong. Accord, McCann
v. Dixie Lake & Realty Co., 44 Ga. App. 700, 162 S.E. 869 (1932).
31 The court will not, however, raise the issue ex viero motza if the defendant
does not object. Southern Stock Fire Ins. Co. v. Southern Ry., 179 N.C. 290, 102
S.E. 504 (1920).
1
Montgomery v. Blades, 222 N.C. 463, 23 S.E.2d 844 (1943) ; Luttrell v. Carolina Mineral Co., 220 N.C. 782, 18 S.E.2d 412 (1942) ; Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C.
82, 6 S.E.2d 808 (1940). The generally accepted definition of proximate cause in
North Carolina is that announced in Adams v. State Bd. of Educ., 248 N.C. 506,
511, 103 S.E.2d 854, 857 (1958): "Proximate cause is a cause which in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new and independent cause, produced the
plaintiff's injuries, and without which the injuries would not have occurred, and
from which a person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably foreseen that
such a result, or some similar injurious result, was probable under the facts as they
existed." McIntyre v. Monarch Elevator & Mach. Co., 230 N.C. 539, 54 S.E.2d
45 (1949) ; .Cant v. Gant, 197 N.C. 164, 148 S.E. 34 (1929) ; Van Dyke v. Chad-
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first tort-feasor could reasonably foresee the intervening act.2 The
following discussion is broken down into types of fact situations in
which the court has tended to be inconsistent and an indication of several
areas in which it has tended to be consistent in cases decided since 1 9 5 4 .8
Intersection Collisions
In cases involving intersection collisions where the first tort-feasor
is driving on the dominant highway and the second tort-feasor enters
from a servient highway the court has applied differing tests. In Loving
v. Whitton4 plaintiff was a passenger in A's'car, which on entering from
the servient highway collided with B's car. Plaintiff alleged that A and
B were concurrently negligent in that A failed to stop at a stop sign
and B was speeding, failed to maintain a proper lookout, and failed to
keep his car under control. ' The court sustained B's demurrer, saying
that reasonable unforeseeability"of the intervenihg act is the test for
insulation and that in the abseiice of allegations"6f fact that B observed
or should have observed tihat A did not intentf to stop, B was entitled to assume'that 'A wv6uld observe the law 5 The court also said
that irrespective of his own negligence B could not have avbided the
6
collision which the 'cohduct-of A nmade inevitable.
In Blalock v. Hart,7 a- dase arisifig on fa6ts' similar to those in the
Loving case, the court-held that there was sufficient evidence to go to'tlae
wick-Hoskins Co., 187 N.C 695, 122 S.E. 657 '(1924); Ramsbottom v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 138 N.C. 39,' 50 S.E. 448 (1905). As defined above, proximate

cause includes actual cause and foreseeability. Traditionally and by good authority
it must be determined that defendant's neglignce actually caused plaintiff's injury
before the question of foreseeability is reached. PROSSER; TORTS § 44 (2d ed.
1955). Actual cause is determined by either the "but for" test or the substantial
factor test. Henderson v. Powell, 221 N.C. 239, 19 S.E.2d 876. (1942) ; PROSSER,
op. cit. supra, §44; RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 430-32 (1934).'
'In Garner v. Pittman, 237 N.C. 328, 75 S.E.2d"Ill (1953, the court said that
foreseeability of the intervening act is the' test for whethe- the intervening act is
such a new, independent and efficient cause as tb'insulate the' original -wrongful
act. -If the intervening act could not have been reasonably foreseen, the original
wrongdoer is insulated. Accord, Moore v. Plymouth, 249 N.C. 423, 106 S.E.2d
695 (1959); Banks v. Shepard, 230 N.C. 86, 52, S.E.2d 215 (1949); Warner v.
Lazarus, 229 N.C. 27, 47 S.E.2d 496 (1948) ; Reeves v. Staley, 220 N.C. 573, 18
S.E.2d 239 (1942); Beach v. Patton, 208 N.C. 134, 179 S.E. 446 (1935); Lineberry v. North Carolina Ry., 187 N.C. 786, 123. S.E. 1 (1924)'; Harton v. Forest
City Tel. Co., 141 N.C. 455, 54 S.E. 299 (1906).
'The scope of ibis Note is limited to discussion of cases decided since publication of the Note on the, same subject'in 33 N.C.L. REv.'498 (1955).
'241 N.C. 273, 84 S.E.2d 919 (1954).
'Accord, Reeves v. Staley, 220 N.C. 573, '18 S.E.2d 239 (1942).
' In the latter statement it appea~s that the court is saying that the negligence
of B was not an actual cause of the collision. To recover plaintiff must prove:
(1) that defendant was negligent; (2) that defendant's negligence actually caused
plaintiff's injury; and (3) that plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable.. See
note 1 supra. If the court decided that defendant's negligence was not an actual
cause of the collision, it would seem that the issue of insulation should not have
been reached.
7239 N.C. 475, 80 S.E.2d 373 (1954).
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jury as against both defendants. 8 The court said that, though there
was no duty on the part of B to foresee negligence, he had a duty of
due care which included maintaining a reasonable speed, keeping a
proper lookout, and taking such action as an ordinarily prudent person
would take to avoid the collision when he noticed or should have noticed
that A was not stopping. These cases are difficult to distinguish. The
court emphasizes the dominant driver's "duty of due care" in Blalock.
Such an emphasis does not afford a logical distinction between the cases,
for the question of insulation does not arise until it is established that
both defendants have breached their duty of due care. It may be that
the court found that B should have observed that A was not stopping.
If this is true, the holding is sound, but such a finding would not seem
warranted by the court's statement of facts. 9
In Primm v. King,'0 arising on facts similar to those in Loving and
Blalock," the court refused to insulate the negligence of B, the dominant
driver, because there was a factual showing that B was on actual notice
that A was not going to stop. Thus, while Loving and Prinmt are
clearly consistent,12 Blalock conflicts with this line of cases.18
Rear-end Collisions
Another area in which confusion has been created by recent decisions
is that of rear-end collisions. One type situation is that represented by
Potter v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc.,14 where plaintiff was injured when
the car in which she was a passenger collided with the rear of a truck
owned by Frosty Morn which was stopped in the road. 5 Plaintiff sued
defendant Potter, the driver of her car, and the trucker. After the trial
court sustained the demurrer of Frosty Morn, defendant Potter filed a
'The evidence indicated that it was after dark (a variation from the facts in
Loving which would seem to justify no difference in legal result), and that at the
intersection involved there was something of a blind corner, but that the lights
of a car approaching the intersection could be seen by the driver of a car on the
intersecting highway. However, there was nothing to indicate to B that A was
going to "run" the stop sign.

' It is arguable that it is the Loving decision that is erroneous, while Blalock

reaches the correct result. In this intersection situation, both parties are negligent, and their negligence concurs to produce the result, the negligence of each

being an actual cause of the injury. For discussion on whether there is ever a
duty to foresee negligence, see note 32 infra.
o249 N.C. 228, 106 S.E.2d 223 (1958).
"The main factual distinction other than that appearing in the text was that
plaintiff was a passenger in the dominant driver's car.

See discussion of these two cases in 37 N.C.L. REv. 456 (1959).
It should be further noted that the court in Prinwm cited Blalock v. Hart,
thus relying on a case which departs from the general rule in these cases established in Loving v. Whifon.
14242
N.C. 67, 86 S.E.2d 780 (1955).
15
The fact situation presented by this case is ambiguous. The court took the
1

1

view that the truck was parked on the road. However, the cross-complaint and
the appellate briefs indicate the possibility that the truck was proceeding down the
highway with Potter following, and that the truck driver stopped suddenly, caus-

ing Potter to crash into the rear of the truck. In this event the case should be
controlled by Banks v. Shepard, 230 N.C. 86, 52 S.E.2d 215 (1949).
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cross-action against Frosty Morn for contribution. 1 6

The court, in sus-

taining Frosty Morn's demurrer to the cross-complaint, said that it was
the active negligence of defendant Potter in failing to observe the truck

which proximately caused the collision.

The court relied on the lan-

guage in Butner v. Spease17 that "if the original wrong only becomes
injurious in consequence of the intervention of some distinct wrongful
act or omission on the part of another or others, the injury is to be
imputed to the last wrong as proximate cause ... ."18 But it is submitted that parking a truck in the highway is indicative of negligence. 9

And if the trucker was negligent, the intervening act and resulting
20
injury would seem to be foreseeable consequences of the risk created.
A similar situation is presented in Howze v. McCall.21 As plaintiff

was proceeding along the highway, a car belonging to defendant Lyons
appeared parked in plaintiff's lane. As plaintiff applied his brakes, he
was struck from behind by a car driven by defendant McCall. In plaintiff's suit against both alleged tort-feasors, 22 the court sustained Lyons'

demurrer, saying that, even conceding negligence on the part of defendant Lyons, there would have been no collision but for the intervening acts of defendant McCall. When viewed in the light of previous
decisions in cases of a similar nature, the decision in Howze is clearly

consistent with the previous holdings.2 3 Despite the consistency, how" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953).
17217
N.C. 82, 6 S.E.2d 808 (1940)
18

(a head-on collision case).
Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C. 82, 88, 6 S.E.2d 808, 811 (1940). See also Caulder
v. Gresham, 224 N.C. 402, 30 S.E.2d 312 (1944), where, on facts similar to the
Potter case, the court stated that the rule is divided into two parts: (1) where the
second actor has become aware of the existence of a potential danger created by
the negligence of the first wrongdoer, and thereafter, by an independent act of
negligence, brings about the accident, the first wrongdoer is relieved of liability;
but (2) where the second actor does not become apprised of the danger until his
own negligence, added to that of the existing perilous condition, has made the
accident inevitable, the negligent acts of the two tort-feasors are contributing
causes and impose liability on both. It appears that the court has applied differing
tests in differing fact situations to give rise to two lines of decisions. Likewise,
in applying Butner v. Spease, the court has failed to recognize that the test for
insulation as there enunciated included reasonable unforeseeability of the intervening act.
19N.C. GmN. STAT. § 20-161 (1953) reads as follows: "(a) No person shall
park or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved
or improved or main traveled portion of the highway, outside of a business or
residence district, when it is practicable to park or leave such vehicle standing off
the paved or improved or main traveled portion of such highway . ..."
'oSee, e.g., Caulder v. Gresham, 224 N.C. 402, 30 S.E.2d 312 (1944), discussed
in note 18 supra; White v. Carolina Realty Co., 182 N.C. 536, 109 S.E.2d 564
(1921), which applies the foreseeability test and holds the first tort-feasor. Contra,
Godwin v. Nixon, 236 N.C. 632, 74 S.E.2d 24 (1953), which though applying the
foreseeability test held the result unforeseeable.
21249 N.C. 250, 106 S.E.2d 236 (1958).
2Plaintiff alleged that Lyons was negligent in parking on the highway and
in failing to warn and that McCall was negligent in following too closely, speeding,
and failing to keep a proper lookout.
" Smith v. Grubb, 238 N.C. 665, 78 S.E.2d 598 (1953) ; Hollifield v. Everhart,
237 N.C. 313, 74 S.E.2d 706 (1953).
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ever, the use of the "but for" test in Howze seems questionable.
The
question should have been whether the intervening act and plaintiff's
26
injury were reasonably foreseeable.
In contrast to the above situation, in rear-end collision cases where
the acts of the two tort-feasors have been more nearly concurrent in
point of time, the court has been consistent in refusing to insulate. Thus,
in Riddle v. Artis2

7

plaintiff alleged that defendant Artis skidded across

the centerline and collided with his automobile and that defendant
Morris negligently ran into the rear of plaintiff's automobile. The demurrer of defendant Morris, the original wrongdoer, was overruled, the
court saying that in order for the doctrine of insulating negligence to
apply, the intervening act must be a new and independent force which
turns aside the natural course of events set in motion by the original
wrongdoer "and produces a result which would not otherwise have
followed and which could not have been reasonably anticipated." 28 This
decision also seems to be in line with the court's holdings in previous
cases of the same or similar character. 29 The use of the foreseeability
test is undoubtedly correct. It is to be: noted that here the original
wrongdoer is not being required to foresee negligence, but he is bound to
foresee that, if for-any .reason the plaintiff is forced to slow down, it is
likely that he will not be able to stop in time to avoid hitting plaintiff's
car. It is difficult to see why the court reached a different result in
Howze from that reached here., Cleaiy, in both the negligence of the
first tort-feasor remains active until the moment of impact. It is sub-

mitted that the court should have refused to insulate in the Howe case.
Where the Plaintiff Is Beyond the Zone of Immediate Danger
The reasoning of the court has also differed in cases where the
plaintiff was beyond the zone of immediate danger created by the negli2 For a discussion of the "but for" test see note 1 supra.
" The "but for" test is a test for actual cause, not for insulation. The court
in saying, "but for the act of McCall no collision would have occurred," has only
established that McCall's negligence was an actual cause of the collision, not that
it was such a cause that Lyons should be insulated. Indeed, it might be said that
"but for" the negligence of 'Lyons (in parking his car on the highway so that
plaintiff had to put on his brakes) no collision would have occurred. Proximate
cause is a two-pronged rule, requiring actual cause and foreseeability. For example,
in Henderson v. Powell, 221 N.C. 239, 19 S.E.2d 876 (1942), the original tort-feasor.
argued that "but for" the intervening act no injury would have occurred and that,
therefore, he should be insulated. The court rejected this, holding that there
might be several causes of an injury and that, in order for one cause to insulate
another cause, the second cause must be unforeseeable.
2" See Smith v. Grubb, 238 N.C. 665, 78 S.E2d 598 (1953), which combines the

two tests.

243 N.C. 668, 91 S.E.2d 894 (1956),
243 N.C. at 671, 91 S.E.2d at 896, quoting Hall v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 234
N.C. 206, 211, 67 S.E,2d 63, 67 (1951).
';Barber v. Wooten, 234 N.C. 107, 66 S.E.2d 690 (1951); Lewis v. Hunter
212 N.C. 504, 193 S.E. 814 (1937); West v. Collins Baking Co., 208 N.C. 526, 18i
S.E. 551 (1935).
2
28
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gence of the two tort-feasors. In Boone v. North Carolina R.R.,3 0
where defendant's train struck a man on the track and hurled his body
against plaintiff's intestate who was twenty-five feet away, causing her
death,31 defendant's demurrer was sustained. The court said that
actionable negligence does not exist unless the act proximately caused
the injury and that this requires foreseeability of injury. Since a defendant is under no duty to foresee negligence on the part of another, 32
in the absence of notice to the contrary he may assume that the other
will exercise ordinary care for his own safety. 33 Therefore, the negligence of the man on the track was the sole proximate cause of the death
of plaintiff's intestate.
In an unusual case, Aldridge v. Hasty,34 defendants Burns and Hasty
were approaching one another from opposite directions on the highway
when, at a point twenty feet apart, Burns turned left in front of Hasty.
In swerving to the left to avoid the inevitable collision, Hasty's car went
across the road, jumped a ditch and an embankment, went three hundred feet up into plaintiff's yard, struck the plaintiff and two cars in
plaintiff's driveway, continued on and mired down in a plowed field one
hundred feet beyond. The court, refusing to insulate Hasty, said that
as to the original collision the negligence of Burns insulated any prior
negligence of Hasty and was the sole proximate cause of the original
collision.3 5 But, it said, if Hasty was driving at such an excessive rate
of speed that he could not thereafter control his car and avoid hitting
the plaintiff, his negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. The court in Hasty has apparently held that plaintiff's injury
could be found to be foreseeable notwithstanding the unforeseeability
of the intervening act.3 6 If the intervening act was unforeseeable, it
would seem that there could be no foreseeable injury resulting from the
:3240 N.C. 152, 81 S.E.2d 380 (1954).
"1Plaintiff alleged that defendant's engineer was negligent in driving the tiain
at seventy-five to ninety miles per hour, in failing to keep a proper lookout, and in
failing to warn.
"As a general rule, the statement that one is not bound to foresee negligence
on the part of another appears to be unsound. The very fact that the first tortfeasor in an intervening negligence situation is not always insulated weakens the
axiom. See Henderson v. Powell, 221 N.C. 239, 19 S.E.2d 876 (1942) ; Bechtler
v. Bracken, 218 N.C. 515, 11 S.E.2d 721 (1940); Gold v. Kiker, 216 N.C. 511, 5
S.E.2d 548 (1939); Harton v. Forest. City Tel. Co., 141 N.C. 455, 54 S.E. 299
(1906).
"' There is room for substantial doubt that the court decided the Boone case on
the issue of insulation. The court seemed to consider the problem one of duty to
a plaintiff off the track, and it is possible that the court decided that the defendant
was not negligent as to plaintiff's intestate. However, in view of plaintiff's allegation that the train was proceeding at seventy-five to ninety miles per hour with
the engineer failing to keep a proper lookout, it seems that the issue of insulation
could properly have been decided.
8,240 N.C. 353, 82 S.E.2d 331 (1954).
" This is in accord with Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C. 82, 6 S.E.2d 808 (1940).
" The application of such. a principle, holding the injury foreseeable notwithstanding the unforeseeability of the intervening act, has not been found in any
other North Carolina cases.
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act. It is submitted that the criteria of these two cases should have been
the same, i.e., one of reasonable foreseeability of the intervening act and
reasonable foreseeability of injury to the plaintiff.

Cases Consistent With PriorAuthority
In other cases a degree of consistency has been reached.

In Fair-

cloth v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.37 the court reaffirmed its prior holdings
that when the driver of the automobile in which plaintiff is a passenger
collides with the side of a moving train, the railroad will be insulated,
despite its negligent failure to warn.38
The court has likewise maintained a degree of consistency in cases
where the first tort-feasor has negligently failed to warn that he has, for
a proper purpose, made the highway unsafe for travel. In White v.
Dickerson, Inc.,3 where the defendant was a construction company
which failed to provide adequate warning that a bridge over a canal
was out and the driver of the automobile in which the plaintiff was a
passenger drove into the canal, the court refused to insulate the construction company, the original wrongdoer, holding the intervening act
reasonably foreseeable. 40 It appears that there is no justification for the
differences of reasoning which allow insulation in the stopped-car, rearend collision cases but refuse insulation in a case where the first tortfeasor has failed to warn that he has made the highway unsafe for travel.
In both types of cases the negligence of the first tort-feasor has continued in active operation until the injury and was an actual cause of
the injury, and in both the injury which occurred was reasonably foreseeable as within the risk created.
CONCLUSION

It is thus apparent that there is confusion and inconsistency not only
within but also among the particular types of fact situations. Throughout the entire field of insulating negligence the lack of uniformity in
reasoning or tests applied is most alarming.
It is .submitted that the court should adhere to the well recognized
test for insulation-foreseeability of the intervening act. That such a
3T247 N.C. 190, 100 S.E2d 328 (1957).
"8Chinnis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.., 219 N.C. 528, 14 S.E2d 500 (1941);
Herman v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 197 N.C. 718, 150 S.E. 361 (1929).
89248 N.C. 723, 105 S.E.2d 51 (1958).
,0In Price v. City of Monroe, 234 N.C. 666, 68 S.E.2d 283 (1951), defendant
had dug a ditch across the street for the purpose of installing a new culvert; dirt

was piled up on the sides but there were no signs or warning lights. Plaintiff and
her husband, the driver, were proceeding along the street, and though plaintiff's
husband saw the dirt, he drove into the ditch. In affirming the judgment for
plaintiff the court said that the test is reasonable unforeseeability of the intervening
act, and that defendant should have foreseen the damage due to lack of warning.
See also Gold v. Kiker, 216 N.C. 511, 5 S.E.2d 548 (1939). It is hoped that this line
of reasoning will overrule that of Haney v. Town of Lincolnton, 207 N.C. 282, 176
S.E. 573 (1934), which is contra.
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practice would lessen the number of insulations is unquestionable, and
this in itself would be a laudable result in view of the fact that in every
dual negligence situation a wrongdoing defendant has actually caused
harm to an innocent plaintiff. At the same time, and probably more
important in the long run, exclusive use of the foreseeability test would
eliminate such confusion and inconsistency as that appearing in cases
since 1954.
JAMES Y. PREsToN

Trusts-United States Savings Bonds-Resulting or Constructive
Trust on Proceeds in the Hands of Surviving Co-owner
In the recent case of Tanner v. Ervin1 a husband and wife jointly
purchased United States Savings Bonds, Series E. The bonds were
issued in their names in the alternative. Subsequently they entered into
a separation and property agreement wherein for a valuable consideration2 the wife transferred her interest in the bonds to her husband.
Thereafter he died with the bonds in his possession but without having
changed the registration of the bonds to his name alone.
The wife brought an action against the deceased's executor claiming
that under the treasury regulations 3 she, as the surviving co-owner of
the bonds, was the sole owner of the bonds and their proceeds. The trial
court agreed with the wife's contention that the treasury regulations
were controlling.
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court by a four-to-three
decision reversed. The court held that while only the surviving coowner might cash the bonds, this did not prevent a state court from
directing the wife to do so and impressing the proceeds therefrom with
a resulting trust for the benefit of the deceased's executor.
Although the pertinent treasury regulation states in effect that upon
the death of one co-owner the surviving co-owner is alone entitled to
receive the proceeds from the government, most courts that have ruled
on the issue have felt free to reach what they considered 'the equitable disposition of the proceeds. The reasoning behind this, as the
court pointed out in Tanner v. Ervin, is that when the bonds are cashed,
1250 N.C. 602, 109 S.E.2d 460 (1959).
CBy the property agreement the wife received two Orange Drink stores in
Charlotte and the home in which she and her husband had lived; the husband
received a 22,467.00 dollar savings account and two checking accounts totaling
24,367.45 dollars in addition to the bonds that had a present value of 17,323.00
dollars.
"If either coowner dies without the bond having been presented and surrendered for payment or authorized reissue, the surviving coowner will be recognized
as the sole and absolute owner of the bond and payment or reissue, as though the
bond were registered in his name alone, will be made only to such survivor." 31
C.F.R. § 315.45 (Supp. 1945) (as amended 31 C.F.R. § 315.61 (1959)). Substantially
identical provisions and regulations apply to all the bonds here under consideration.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

the contract between the federal government and the purchasers is completely executed and the federal government has no further interest
therein.4 Thus notwithstanding the treasury regulations, numerous
courts have ordered the registered co-owner to cash United States
Savings Bonds and hold the proceeds in trust for the true owner.5
In the principal case the court labeled the trust imposed upon the
proceeds of the bonds a resulting trust. A resulting trust is one which
"arises where a person makes or causes to be made a disposition of
property under circumstances which raise an inference that he does not
intend that the persons taking or holding the property should have the
beneficial interest 'therein and where the inference is not rebutted and
the beneficial interest is not otherwise effectively disposed of."0
The facts of the principal case might be interpreted as giving rise to
a resulting trust on the inference that, in view of the terms of the separation agreement as a whole, neither the husband nor the wife intended
her retention of the record interest in the bonds to constitute a beneficial
interest.
Several courts when faced with, facts similar to those in Tanner v.
Ervin have used ;, constructive trust to reach the desired result.1 A
constructive trust is defined as "a remedial device of the court of equity
for taking property from one who has acquired it or retains it wrongfully and vesting title in another in order to prevent unjust enrichment." s
Although this type of trust is usually thought of as a "fraud-rectifying"
trust, the element of fraud is by no means essential to it.0 At least two
"In re Hendricksen's Estate, 156 Neb. 463, 56 N.W.2d 711 (1953); Katz v.
Driscoll, 86 Cal. App. 2d 313, 322, 194 P.2d 822, 828 (1948), -where the court said,
"The purpose of the treasury regulations is to protect and hold the federal government immune from any attack on its performance of the contract as made in the
bond. In other words, they were designed to prevent the implication of the government in any disputes concerning ownership of the bonds, protect it from any suits
which might result from payment to a designated beneficiary or coowner, and,
for the purpose of promoting sales, guarantee the performance of the government
in strict accord with the contract."
5
Silverman v. McGinnes, 259 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1958) ; Roman v. Smith, 228
Ark. 833, 314 S.W.2d 225 (1958);- Katz v. Driscoll, 86 Cal. App. 2d 313, 194
P.2d 822 (1948); Tharp v. Besozzi, 144 N.E.2d 430 (Ind. App. 1957); Henderson's Adm. v. Bewley, 264 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1953) ; Bruso v. Pinquet, 321 Mich.
630, 33 N.W.2d 100 (1948); Nelson v. Rasmussen, 164 Neb. 274, 82 N.W.2d 418
(1957) ; Ibey v. Ibey, 93 N.H. 434i 43 A.2d 157 (1945) ; see also Annot., 51 A.L.R.
(1957).
2d 163
0
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS, Introductory Note § 404, at 322 (1959).
For examples of resulting trusts in North Carolina see Kelly Springfield Tire Co.
v. Lester, 190 N.C. 411, 130 S.E. 45 (1925) ; Oakhurst Lnd Co. v. Newell, 185
N.C. 410, 117 S.E. 341 (1923) ;. Harris v. Harris, 178 N.C. 7, 100 S.E. 125 (1919) ;
Norcum v. Savage, 140 N.C. 472, 53 S.E. 289 (1906) ; see generally Edwards and
Van Hecke, Purchase Money Resulting Trusts it North Carolina, 9 N.C.L. REv.
177 (1931); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TUSTS § 440 (1959).
7 Roman v. Smith, 228 Ark. 843, 314 S.W.2d 225 (1958) ; Tharp v. Besozzi, 144
N.E.2d 430 (Ind. App. 1957).
s BOGERT, TRUSTS,

§ 71

(3rd 6d. 1952).

'Petersen v. Swan, 239 Minn. 98, 57 N.W.2d 842 (1953), which held that where
a wrongdoer uses money of another to purchase United States Savings Bonds in
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North Carolina cases have sanctioned constructive trusts notwithstanding the fact that no actual fraud was proved. In Sorrell v. Sorrell'
the evidence tended to show a conveyance of land by an uncle to his
nephew pursuant to a general scheme for working out and liquidating
the indebtedness owed by the uncle. Hence the court found a confidential relationship existed between the parties and impressed a constructive trust upon the land even though there were neither allegations
nor evidence of fraud. In Crew v. Crew" the plaintiff had arranged
for his brother to manage his land while plaintiff was serving in the
armed forces. When he returned his brother refused to give up the
land. The court held that the question of whether a confidential relationship existed was one for the jury, but intimated that if one were
found to exist, the mere breach of it would constitute grounds for impressing a constructive trust.
In the principal case the court could have utilized the above cases
and declared a constructive trust. The wife in the principal case was
in a confidential relationship with her husband and breached her property
settlement agreement with him by claiming the ownership of the bond
proceeds.
It should be noted, however, that the same result would have been
reached had the court declared a constructive trust instead of a resulting
trust. Either method
would place the proceeds from the bonds in the
12
husband's estate.
In Tanner v. Ervin the court was faced squarely with the question:
Would the wife, the registered co-owner of the bonds, be unjustly
enriched if she were allowed the proceeds therefrom? The majority of
the court answered affirmatively, reasoning that it would be unfair to
allow the wife to retain the benefits she had previously relinquished for
valuable consideration.
The dissenting members of the court thought that equity should not
act to give the proceeds of the bonds to the executor of the deceased's
estate because there would be no inequity to correct when the United
States had discharged its contractual obligation to the registered survivor of the co-owners. They believed that the husband knew what
interest he received by the separation agreement, i.e., an option to have
the bonds cashed and alone receive the proceeds or to have them reissued
the name of a third person, the owner of the money is entitled to follow it into
the property and enforce a constructive trust upon the property purchased. The
court noted that where fraud might give rise to the establishment of a constructive
trust, it need not always be shown before such a trust may be impressed.

N.C.460, 152 S.E. 157 (1930).
236 N.C. 528, 73 S.E.2d 309 (1952) ; see also 31 N.C.L. REv. 242 (1953).

10198
'

'2 Anderson v. Benson, 117 F.
Supp. 765 (D. Neb. 1953), and Union Nat.
Bank v. Jessell, 358 Mo. 467, 215 S.W.2d 474 (1948), are illustrative cases where
courts imposed a resulting trust in what might have been considered a constructive
trust situation.
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in his name alone; or to do neither and have the proceeds of the bonds
go to the other co-owner, his wife, upon his death. The fact that he
chose the latter fairly indicated to the dissenting members his desire to
have his wife and business partner of many years enjoy what she helped
to acquire.
It is submitted that when one considers both the strong inference
that the husband did not intend his wife to take the proceeds from the
bonds, and the need for preventing the wife's unjust enrichment, the
majority would seem to present the more convincing argument.
HoWARD A. KNOX, JR.

